Alex J Allen
In the light of a transformed political landscape in the aftermath of 9/11, Senator Chuck Hagel’s response was that, ‘this changes everything’. It was countered by retiring Senator Jesse Helms’ view that nothing had changed in Sino-American relations, and that nothing should change
[1]. The Chinese-US relationship remains beset by more profound differences than any other bilateral relationship between major powers in the world today. It is an extremely complex and highly paradoxical unity of opposites. It is not a relationship of confrontation and rivalry for primacy, as the U.S.-Soviet relationship was during the Cold War yet, but it does contain some of the same characteristics
[2]. David Lampton has diplomatically concluded that, ‘unsurprisingly some things have changed, and others have not. The trick is figure out which is which.’
[3] In this essay I will examine the way in which 9/11 affected the objectives and priorities of China and America, their perceptions of each other and whether any potential increase in their bilateral ties is likely to be a permanent one. I will also attempt to distinguish between what has changed, and in actual legislation. However, in order to accurately gauge a potential shift in Sino-American policy since 9/11, it is first necessary to gain a sense of Sino-American relations prior to it under both the Clinton administration, and under George W. Bush before the terrorist attacks occurred so as to have something to compare the post 9/11 period to.
As their countries first leaders since the culmination of the cold war, Clinton and Zemin faced a difficult challenge of bringing their countries in to a modern era, and demonstrating that they could manage the bilateral relationship effectively. In Clinton’s first term, Lampton argues that, ‘their bilateral relationship was not simply about trade, technology or promoting individual rights. It was about war and peace’
[4]. Clinton famously sought to describe it as a ‘strategic partnership’
[5], and in the 1998 National Security Strategy For A New Century asserted that, ‘a stable, open, prosperous China that assumes its responsibilities for building a more peaceful world is clearly and profoundly in our interests’
[6]. Clinton also concluded that attempting to isolate China would be ‘unworkable’, and that ‘our success in working with China as a partner in building a stable international order depends upon establishing a productive relationship that will build sustained domestic support’
[7]. Clinton essentially recognised the increasing interconnectedness between the two nations, and sought to nullify China’s potential for disruption by embedding in to as many international regimes and binding commitments as possible
[8]. This proved to be largely successful, and this concept proved to be the backbone of the Clinton administration’s policies when dealing with the relationship, even helping to facilitate the Zemin’s visit to the Washington in 1997, the first by a President of China to the United States in 12 years, and a reciprocal visit from Clinton to Beijing a year later.
Relations under W. Bush before September 11th were fraught with friction and uncertainty, as he came to office with the open intention to rename China
The first ominously fictitious encounter between the two was the Hainan spy plane incident of April 2001, saw an only recently inaugurated George W. Bush administration at loggerheads with the Chinese following a mid air collision between an American spy plan and a Chinese jet, leading to a stand off between the Bush administration and Beijing, and strong rhetoric from Bush himself, ‘my reaction is, is that the Chinese must promptly allow us to have contact with the 24 airmen and women that are there and return our plane to us without any further tampering. I sent a very clear message and I expect them to heed the message.’
[9] However, whilst China did return the crew unharmed after eleven days, and the situation was eventually resolved with the ‘letter of two sorries’ in which US Ambassador Joseph Prueher made strides to appease the Chinese by saying, ‘both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have expressed their sincere regret over your missing pilot and aircraft’
[10], the episode emanated new thinking on relations between the two nations. Despite Bush’s intention to, ‘ask our United States representative to ask the tough questions about China's recent practice of challenging United States aircraft operating legally in international air space,’
[11] China were unprecedented in their resilience to this confrontational rhetoric and showed no intention at all to accommodate the US, and significance that the crew of the spy plane were only release following a formal apology from the White House must not be underestimated in assessing China’s intention to challenge America’s unilateralism. Following the episode Bush’s conclusion that, ‘the kind of incident we have just been through does not advance a constructive relationship between our two countries,’
[12] appeared to suggest that relations between the two nations had deteriorated to an all time low.
What has changed since 9/11 is, as Rosemary Foot has argued, that China has made strides to embrace modern concepts such as globalization, multilateralism and cooperative security since
[13]. There is certainly evidence of this; Chinese entry in to the World Trade Organisation in November 2001 was an integral measure in integrating China in to the world economy. China recognised the inherent need for a peaceful relationship with America in order to progress their economic development. In the aftermath of 9/11 Beijing cooperated. It lent diplomatic support in persuading Pakistan, a close Chinese ally and a key country in the American effort in Afghanistan, to cooperate with Washington. Beijing voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1368 authorising the use of military force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the first time Beijing has voted for the international use of force since taking its seat in 1971
[14]. In taking these measures to accommodate the US, China made strides to redefine itself as a strategic competitor and greatly improve bilateral ties between the two nations
[15]. These developments appear a combination of immediate Chinese reaction to the threat of terrorism, and a more long term objective of a ‘peaceful rise’ to economic prosperity. They appear, in many ways, to subscribe to Aaron Friedberg’s conceptions of ‘liberal optimism’, in that as China enters the World Trade Organisation and opens its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital, Sino-American commercial linkages will undoubtedly increase
[16].
WRITE ABOUT LONG TRENDS VERSUS REACTION TO 9/11
Meanwhile, at a time when political relations between China and the United States are relatively stable and economic and trade links are expanding, Taiwan remains a major source of agitation. The 2002 American National Security Strategy did little to suggest that America had any interest in accommodating China over the issue, by suggesting that, ‘when we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan…we see examples of how authoritarian systems can evolve, marrying local traditions with the principles that we all cherish’
[17]. The 2006 Security Strategy went further by suggesting that, ‘democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny’
[18], which would be perceived as a slight against China over the Taiwan issue and its own political ideology. Asked if America had an obligation to protect Taiwan on Good Morning America, George Bush said. ‘yes we do, and the Chinese have to understand that.’
[19] Former presidents have stopped short of elaborating on what the US response would be to a Chinese attack on Taiwan in a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’
[20]. ‘However Bush, albeit refusing to commit to sending troops, has commented frequently and forcefully about the consequences China could expect if they resorted to force to resolve the Taiwan issue, commenting in the New York Times that, ‘it is important for the Chinese to understand that if there’s a military action, we will help Taiwan defend itself’
[21], and that,
‘What the Chinese need to assume is that if they violate the One China Policy, the longstanding One China Policy, which has clearly said that the United States expects there to be a peaceful resolution between China and Taiwan, if they decide to use force, the United States must help Taiwan defend itself. Now, the Chinese can figure out what that means. But that’s going to mean a resolute stand on my part’
[22]. The significance of this is that it could be viewed as guaranteed American intervention which could encourage Taiwan overconfidence and escalate the already fragile situation, a consequence that strategic ambiguity was deployed to prevent. In this sense 9/11 has demonstrated that certain issues remain vital and unresolved between China and America, and there is little room for accommodation or maneuver over them. In this way certain trends have remained constant from the Clinton administration right through to George W. Bush’s second term in office, and regardless of China’s status as a partner or a competitor, there are certain underlying differences.
Another perennially contentious issue for Sino-American relations is the unresolved dispute with North Korea. China is faced with a continuing balancing act between its duel reliance upon the two nations. As her only formal ally, and also importantly another socialist state openly hostile to the United States and a useful buffer between Chinese territory and US military bases in North Korea, it seems logical that Pyongyang would be a perfect partner for security cooperation against the American presence in Asia
[23]. Yet following the government of North Korea’s claim they had conducted a nuclear missile test in 2006, President Bush announced,
‘This [opposition to the North Korea nuclear missile test] was confirmed this morning in conversations I had with leaders of China, and South Korea, Russia, and Japan. We reaffirmed our commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and all of us agreed that the proclaimed actions taken by North Korea are unacceptable and deserve an immediate response by the United Nations Security Council’
[24]. China is the one nation with the economic, military and political power to deal with North Korea. Despite the U.N. Security Council taking a swift response, by voting unanimously to enforce North Korea with trade and travel restrictions China still has more ways to influence North Korea than any other member of the U.N. Security Council. It has been suggested by Anne Applebaum that China has more ways to influence North Korea than all of the members of the Security Council put together
[25]. Should China's leaders want to see the North Korean regime fall, they don't need to play around with sanctions or blockades. They could just cut off energy supplies to Pyongyang, food deliveries to Pyongyang or simply end all trade with it. That they continue to stall over in taking concrete action against North Korea despite publically stating that they are ‘totally opposed’
[26] to North Korean nuclear missile testing, demonstrates their torn alliegiance over the issue and that it will continue to be a thorn in the side of the Sino-American relationship.
Although the war on terror has been widely perceived to have improved Sino-American relations and given the two nations a common interest, the opinion exists that it is little more than an American smokescreen to further their global hegemony. Chinese foreign affairs analysts are also suspicious that Washington is using the war on terror not only to root out Al Qaeda and its allies, but also to extend a decade long objective or strategically encircling China
[27]. Adam Ward talks of a ‘strategic subtext’ to the American reaction to 9/11, which he asserted was, ‘Washington constructing a growing coalition of states, and, either implicitly or explicitly, setting down benchmarks for good behaviour and bad behaviour, based upon counter terrorism and non proliferation’
[28]. Moreover, the broad coalition formed in the immediate aftermath to 9/11 was based upon an acceptance of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as primary targets. However the US could expect far more misgivings and opposition from Beijing and others if it were to extend these targets
[29]. It has
In conclusion Bush’s originally stated intention to redefine the China as a ‘strategic competitor’
[30] rather than ally does not ring as true in certain aspects today. The competitive elements of the difficult Sino-American relationship certainly remain. There are still no easy resolutions regarding the reunification of Taiwan, China’s complicated relationship with North Korea or indeed the future of US hegemony and the issues that will arise as a consequence of China’s continued economic growth. However as Denny Roy concludes, ‘global terrorism replaced China as the primary threat to US interests after 9/11/’
[31]. Whilst there is truth in this, the rapprochement is based upon the war on terror and that alone, and there is little to convince that if Beijing does not face an increased terrorist threat itself the rekindled partnership could dismantle and China could withdraw from the coalition against terror altogether. Moreover, the broad coalition formed in the immediate aftermath to 9/11 was based upon an acceptance of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as primary targets. However the US could expect far more misgivings and opposition from Beijing and others if it were to extend these targets
[32]. The China Security Review’s conclusion that the US was a, ‘partner of convenience’
[33] in 2002 remains an extremely telling analysis of China’s take on the political climate. Bush’s observation that, ‘As we move forward, the United States and China will, no doubt, again face difficult issues and fundamental disagreements. We disagree on important basic issues such as human rights and religious freedom. At times, we have different views about the path to a more stable and secure Asian-Pacific region,’
[34] is further evidence that China and America remain two countries, as Lampton puts it, ‘increasingly near one another in the same global bed, but our respective national institutions, interests, leadership and popular perceptions, and the very characters of our peoples, ensure that our nations have substantially different dreams’
[35].
In the context of comparison post to pre 9/11, it seems extremely unlikely that
[1] D. Lampton, Small Mercies, China and America After 9/11, The National Interest, Winter 2001/2002
[2] W. Jisi, Searching For Stability With America, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2005, p.3
[3] D. Lampton, Small Mercies, China and America After 9/11, The National Interest, Winter 2001/2002
[4] Asian Survey Vol. 37, No. 12, p.1103
[5] D. Lampton, Small Mercies, China and America After 9/11, The National Interest, Winter 2001/2002
[6] http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nssr-98.pdf
[7] http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nssr-98.pdf
[8] Shambaugh, Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, University of California Press 1996, p184.
[9] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010402-4.html
[10] http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/11/prueher.letter.text/
[11] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010412-6.html
[12] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010412-6.html
[13] R. Foot
[14] H. Miller, Beijing and the American war on terrorism, Strategic Insight, Volume One Issue 5, June 2002, p.1
[15] H. Miller, Beijing and the American war on terrorism, Strategic Insight, Volume One Issue 5, June 2002, p.1
[16] Friedberg.
[17] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/sectionII.html
[18] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionIII.html
[19] http://www.wws.princeton.edu/bushconf/BushChronology.pdf
[20] New York Times, p. A10 Feb 26, 2000
[21] New York Times, p. A10 Feb 26, 2000
[22] GOP debate in Los Angeles Mar 2, 2000
[23] D. Roy, China’s Reaction to America’s Dominance, Autumn 2003 Survival, p.7
[24] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061009.html
[25] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101601018.html
[26] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101601018.html
[27] H. Miller, Beijing and the American war on terrorism, Strategic Insight, June 2002, p.2
[28] A Ward, (Atumn 2003) China and Amerca: Trouble Ahead? Survival
[29] D. Lampton, Small Mercies, China and America After 9/11, The National Interest, Winter 2001/2002
[30] http://www.4president.com
[31] D Roy, (Autumn) 2003) China’s reaction to American Predominance, Survival
[32] D. Lampton, Small Mercies, China and America After 9/11, The National Interest, Winter 2001/2002
[33] http:china.usc.edu
[34] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010412-6.html
[35] Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations 1889-2000, D. Lampton, University of California Press 2002, p.1
